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Abstract. The objective of this article is to develop a policy of indirect taxation on output 
factors that reconciles losses in case of a waiver of the direct tax in Cameroon. This initiative 
would help in solving the “Anglophone crisis” in Cameroon by addressing the half of the 
total tax collected that amounts at CFAF 2429.15 billion to their victims. A static computable 
general equilibrium model has enabled us to determine the equivalent rate applicable to the 
labor factor that would make it possible to compensate for losses if the government shifts 
away from taxation of household income. This rate is 34.569% for an income tax rate of 20%. 
It also enables boosting growth with an impact on GDP of 7.8%. Besides, each household 
group that receipts all the other half of tax collected from an indirect tax rate of 10% earns on 
well-being whereas in case of an equal sharing only the poor households benefit from it.  
Keywords. Taxation, Prices, Factors, Crisis, Computable general equilibrium. 
JEL. C68, E62, H30, H53. 
 
1. Introduction 
ince 2013, Cameroon is facing an unprecedented security crisis. This 
began with the Boko Haram group in the northern part of the country 
where the defense and bravery of the armed forces have maintained 
control over this part of the country. Since October 2016, there have been 
the corporatist demands of Anglophone lawyers and teachers on the 
bipolarity of the texts that should have French and English versions. These 
unresolved claims served as a voice for the emergence of secessionist 
movements that brought trouble to the national public order. They claim 
the split of the country giving rise to the birth of a state called Ambazonia. 
The consequences, are quite disastrous. First on the humanitarian front, 
International Crisis Group (2018) indicates that, this crisis has caused more 
than 1850 deaths, 53000 internally displaced persons and 35000 refugees in 
Nigeria after 30 months of existence. Economically, it has caused losses of 
6434 formal jobs and more than 8000 informal jobs for a shortfall of around 
CFAF 300 billion according to GICAM (2018), given that the two 
 
 a† Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Dschang, Cameroon. 
. +237 697 542 689 . r_tchoffo@yahoo.fr  
b  Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Dschang, Cameroon. 
. +237 695 754 269 . nkemghazeufackguivis@yahoo.fr 
c Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Dschang, Cameroon. 
. +237 694 615 526 . Tadzongmouafopaul@yahoo.com 
 
S 
Turkish Economic Review 
R.N. Tchoffo, G.Z. Nkemgha, & T.M. Paul, TER, 6(4), 2019, p.267-293. 
268 
268 
Anglophone regions, particularly the North-West and South-west represent 
abound a fifth of the national wealth. These losses exclusively related to the 
Anglophone regions are certainly not without ripple effect on the other 
regions of the country. For example, the difficulties faced by North-West’ 
wood marketing operators in the border west region of the country. The 
shortage created in addition to causing inflation creates bottlenecks in the 
local wood processing industries. With this situation, a number of actions 
have been taken by the government to ease the tensions and frustrations 
among which: the establishment of a humanitarian assistance plan for the 
victims of the crisis, the setting up of a demobilization commission for 
disarmament and social reintegration. But the tensions do not seem to 
subside. No doubt the call for inclusive national dialogue by national and 
international political actors is a solution, but the fact remains that other 
palliative measures must continue to be considered which measures could 
continue after the crisis. 
It is in this context that we situate our study centered on fiscal policy. The 
upstream of these investigations is to put forth the problem of managing 
the security crisis in Cameroon.  
It is recognized that government revenue has a twofold nature: a part is 
derived from the indirect tax on production and on the factors of 
production (Cardenete et al., 2017) and the other part comes from the direct 
tax collected on households and firms’ income. In order to help ease the 
current social tensions throughout the country, we consider in this study 
the hypothesis of the collection of an additional tax on output and on labor 
factor with a half transferable to victims of the crisis and the other 
transferable to all national households. As a result, the central question is 
whether such a decision could be effective. 
On the theoretical base, a slight intensification of all indirect taxes should 
reduce demand compensated in the same proportion for all goods as 
shown by Ramsey (1927). This fall in compensated demand is explained by 
the substitution effects that will emerge from household behavior. In this 
sense Sadka (1977) has established a necessary and sufficient condition to 
make this possible. It will be necessary that the compensated elasticities 
with respect to the wage rate of the different products are all equal. The 
theoretical model of Ramsey, however, will suffer from a major criticism 
that is to consider only one household. For example, Diamond (1975) in his 
model with several households showed that the reduction in compensated 
demand may not be proportional to the different household groups. This 
reduction should be lower if the consumption of the product concerned is 
concentrated between groups who firstly, have a high valuation of 
marginal income in terms of welfare and secondly, have a high probability 
to pay tax. 
A better analysis of tax reforms according to Ahmad & Stern (1991) will 
depend on the efficiency of revenue collection, its impact on the 
distribution of income, welfare and the motivation of the tax system in 
relation to economic activities.  For these objectives, economic theory plays 
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a central role in the design of the tax structure. It indicates a simple model 
benchmark from which political implications can be inferred and provides 
a method for collecting and analyzing data. The focus of the analysis is to 
question how income can be generated through taxation but so as to 
continue over time and especially to boost the growth. 
On the empirical side, there is a great deal of investigation on the effects 
of the indirect tax on welfare (Almad & Stern 1991; Chan & Dung 2002; 
Toan 2005; Verde & Tol 2009; Dung 2018). These are specific to address the 
issue using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. Among these 
works, Dung (2018) examines the hypothesis of the effects of a 20% 
increase in VAT in Vietnam and concludes that government revenues 
increase by 4.9% against a decline in both income and Household 
consumption. But beyond all these conclusions, a strong observation 
relayed by Warren (2008) is that consumption taxes have a significant 
negative impact on the distribution of household disposable income 
regardless of the methodological approach adopted. This shows at the 
same time that very few works considered the question of the indirect tax 
on factors of production which according to Cardenete et al., (2017) is 
equally an important instrument tax for the government. Moreover, the 
management of the security crisis like the problems facing Cameroon today 
seems to be completely ignored in these works. To carry out such a study 
seems to be very important on the socio-economic level, especially since 
this crisis is subject to unbearable costs for the government. 
This is why we propose in this article to provide a palliative solution 
based on the indirect tax on the labor factor which will not only help the 
citizens of the crisis zones, but also to ease the social tensions that are 
currently rife across the whole of the national territory. This indirect tax on 
labor would compensate for this loss if the government were to give up the 
collection of 20% of consumer income. Basically, we assume a 10% increase 
in the rate of the tax on production so that half of the resulting income is 
transferable to the victims of the crisis and the other transferable to all 
national households by distinguishing rich households from poor 
households. As a result, the central question is whether the adoption of 
such a decision could be effective. 
Thus, the following section 2 is devoted to the review of past works on 
the policy of indirect taxation, section 3 presents the methodological 
approach that will help to obtain the results presented in section 4. A 
conclusion ends our investigations in section 5. 
 
2. Literature review 
We first of all carry out a theoretical review on the effects of indirect 
taxation, then an empirical review of the related works that has addressed 
the issue of indirect taxation using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model, a tool used in this work. 
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2.1. Theoretical review of the indirect taxation  
Originally, the fundamental works that put forth the effects of an 
indirect tax upstream date back to Ramsey (1927) and Diamond (1975). The 
difference between these two works is that Ramsey (1927) considers in his 
model a single household while Diamond (1975) considers several ones 
which also allow him to question some of Ramseys’ results. The latter 
considers an economy of consumption in which the consumer can divide 
his total budget between leisure and the purchase of a certain number of 
goods. It studies the effectiveness of commodity taxation by assuming that 
the income tax is zero. With this in mind, he realizes that a slight 
intensification of all indirect taxes should reduce the compensated demand 
in the same proportion for all goods. Substitution effects are associated 
with efficiency losses. Ahmad & Stern (1991) thought that this finding gives 
no clarification of the optimal tax structure that it will depend on the 
efficiency of revenue collection, its impact on income distribution on well-
being, and the motivation of the tax system in relation to economic 
activities. Thus, a necessary and sufficient condition for such a result to 
occur is that the compensated elasticities with respect to the wage rates of 
different products are all equal. It also means that a reduction in the wage 
rate following a proportional increase in the income tax will reduce the 
claims compensated in the same proportion. 
However, Diamond (1975) demonstrates that these results can change if 
the behavior of several households is taken into consideration. He realizes 
that it is possible in such a case that the reduction in compensated demand 
is not proportional to the different household groups. This reduction 
should be lower if the consumption of the product concerned is 
concentrated between groups who firstly, have a high valuation of 
marginal income in terms of welfare and secondly, have a high probability 
to pay tax. He is followed by Deaton (1981) in his idea, who also shows that 
if we move to a multi-consumer economy and assume that the planner has 
preferences in favor of equity, the almost divisibility leads to a progressive 
tax structure. The low divisibility between commodities and leisure leads 
to a regressive indirect tax structure in the case of the single consumer. The 
introduction of an egalitarian planner and many savings in consumption 
will bring the solution to progressivity. Besley & Jewitt (1995) generalize 
this result by testing its applicability to a utility function. 
 
2.2. Review of empirical works on the effects of indirect taxation: 
A CGE approach 
Two papers published in the United Kingdom by the Institute for Fiscal 
Studies (IFS), namely Crawford et al., (2008) and Crossley et al., (2009), 
question the findings of other research and the widely accepted consensus 
that indirect taxes such as value added tax (VAT) are regressive. Crawford 
et al., (2008) postulate that an optimal consumption tax, levied at a rate 
unchanged over time, equates to a proportional tax on wages, transfers and 
income from profits. Crossley et al., (2009), while partially admitting the 
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negative effects of VAT on income, moderate their conclusion by stating 
that when the rich has more savings than the poor, this temporarily allows 
him to escape a high proportion of his income that could have been subject 
to VAT. This savings only incurs tax once it is subject to the expense. It is 
therefore important in such a situation that VAT does not necessarily affect 
the household income negatively. VAT should follow a progressive system 
to act in the first direction. 
In the framework of the CGE, the studies on the effects of the indirect 
tax are plethoric and involve the great majority the well-being of the 
households (Almad & Stern, 1991; Chan & Dung, 2002; Toan, 2005; Verde & 
Tol, 2009; Dung, 2018). A consequent review of indirect taxation can be 
found in Warren (2008). The latter shows that beyond the methodological 
differences, all studies agree that consumption taxes have a significant 
negative impact on the distribution of household disposable income. Dung 
(2018), examining the hypothesis of the effects of a 20% increase in VAT in 
Vietnam, concludes that government revenues increase by 4.9% against a 
decline in both household income and consumption. Verde & Tol (2009) 
indicate that the lifestyles of low-income people can exacerbate the 
regressivity of indirect taxation, particularly carbon taxes, as they are less 
energy-efficient and use fuels with higher carbon intensity. They also argue 
that the carbon tax is likely to be less regressive on consumption than on 
disposable income. Chan et al., (1999) in a tax reform study in Vietnam 
show that a sale tax reform positively contributes to the economy. It also 
has significant redistributive effects that tend to overwhelm the overall 
impact. Chan & Dung (2002) reach almost the same conclusions, with 
particular emphasis on the positive social well-being effects that such a 
reform might entail. Then, the tariffs should be eliminated beforehand. 
However, the elimination of tariffs leads to growing inequalities between 
rich and poor, but also between rural households and urban households. In 
the same vein, Chan et al., (2005) obtain similar results by orienting their 
study on the labor market. Toan (2005), on the other hand, finds a negative 
impact of the elimination of tariffs but with mixed results between the 
urban households that earn and the rural households that lose. 
 
3. Methodology 
The methodological approach adopted in this article is inspired from the 
work of Cardenete et al., (2017). The latter in their model determine the tax 
rate on the labor factor compatible with a cancellation of the direct tax on 
the income of consumers. They make the following assumptions: 
 The economy includes two factors of production including labor 
and capital, two consumers, the government, two firms and two 
goods; 
 The factors are owned by two consumers who sell them to two 
firms and the income they derive from them is used to finance their 
consumption; 
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 The value added of each firm, resulting from the transformation of 
the factors of production, is combined with the intermediate 
consumption to produce the final output; 
 Each firm produces only one good; 
 The production, consumption and value-added functions are of the 
Cobb Douglas type with constant returns to scale; 
 The government has three sources of revenue: the indirect tax on 
final output, the indirect tax on factors and the direct tax on the 
income of consumers; 
 All collected tax is transferred to consumers 
In this article, we make the following changes and additions: 
 The economy still has two households, but the first one is a rich 
household determined on the basis of national wealth at the official 
poverty rate1 and the second one is a poor household; 
 The government deploys 50% of the total additional tax collected to 
support the victims of the security crises of North West and South 
West and the remainder is transferred to households. 
 
3.1. Variables and parameters of the model 
The ratings are those of Cardenete et al., (2017) to which we add 
variables and parameters that take into account the weight of transferable 
government income to households. For simplicity we summarize them 
below. 
 
No Variables Description 
1 𝑃𝑖  Price of good 𝑖 
2 𝜔𝑘  Price of the factor of production 𝑘 
3 𝜔𝑛𝑘  Net price of the factor of production 𝑘 
4 𝑌𝑖  Total output of firm 𝑖 
5 𝑃𝑣𝑎𝑖  Value added price for firm 𝑖 
6 𝑏𝑘 ,𝑖  Technical coefficient for the use of the factor of production 𝑘 
by firm 𝑖 
7 𝐶𝑖 ,ℎ  Individual demand for the consumption of good 𝑖  by the 
household ℎ 
8 𝐶𝐷𝑖  Aggregate demand for final consumption of good 𝑖 
9 𝑋𝑘 ,𝑖  Demand for the factor of production 𝑘 by the firm 𝑖 
10 𝑋𝐷𝑘  Aggregate demand for the factor of production 𝑘 
11 𝑇𝐶 Total tax collected by the government 
12 𝑇𝐶𝑇 Tax collected and transferable to households 
13 𝑂𝑇 Tax collected on output 
14 𝐹𝑇 Tax collected on production factors  
15 𝑀𝑇 Tax collected on household income 
16 𝐺𝐷𝑃  GDP based on income approach at market price 
17 𝑖𝑌𝑖 ,𝑗  Intermediary consumption of good 𝑖 by the firm 𝑗 
18 𝑉𝐴𝑖  Value added of the firm's branch 𝑖 
19 𝑍 Variable for objective function 
 
1 It is 37.5% in 2017 
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   Parameters Description 
1 𝑒𝑘 ,ℎ  Household endowment ℎ in the factor of production 𝑘 
2 𝛽𝑖 ,ℎ  Elasticity of the demand for good𝑖 by household ℎ 
3 𝑎𝑖 ,𝑗  Input-output matrix coefficient 
4 𝛼𝑘 ,𝑖  Elasticity of demand for the production factor k by the firm 𝑖 
5 𝑣𝑖  Coefficient of value added in branch 𝑖 
6 𝜏𝑖  Government tax rate on product 𝑖 
7 𝑚ℎ  Income tax rate on household ℎ 
8 𝛿ℎ  Fraction of tax transferred to household ℎ in TCT 
9 𝑡𝑘  Rate of tax applied on factor 𝑘 
10 𝜗 Fraction of government income transferred to households 
With  𝐼 ⊆  {𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦, 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠},𝑘 ⊆  {𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟,𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙} 
ℎ ⊆  {𝑅𝑖𝑐ℎ ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑,𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑} 
 
3.2. Equations 
The model is based on a system of simultaneous equations integrating 
four groups of variables (commodity prices 𝑃𝑖 , factor prices𝜔𝑘 , output 
levels 𝑌𝑖and tax level T). 
Let's start from the basic equations formulated by Cardenete et al., (2017) 
for which the price of the value added 𝑃𝑣𝑎𝑖is related to the price of factor 
𝜔𝑘  by equation 1 and of the following price equation  𝑃𝑖(2): 
 
𝑃𝑣𝑎𝑖 =  𝜔𝑘
𝛼𝑘 ,𝑖
𝑘          (1) 
𝑃𝑖 =  1 + 𝜏𝑖 .  𝑃𝑣𝑎𝑖 . 𝑣𝑖 +  𝑃𝑗𝑎𝑗 ,𝑖𝑗         (2) 
 
By replacing  1 in 2 ,we obtain: 
 
𝑃𝑖 =  1 + 𝜏𝑖 .   𝜔𝑘
𝛼𝑘 ,𝑖
𝑘 . 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑃𝑗𝑎𝑗 ,𝑖𝑗        (3) 
 
The relation  3 gives a system of 3 equations (because the set 𝑖 contains 
three elements agriculture, industry and services) and 5 unknown variables 
in particular (𝑃1 ,𝑃2 ,𝑃3 ,𝜔1 ,𝜔2). This system can not therefore be solved 
independently except to fix two variables. To find the additional equations, 
Let’s start from the following equations 2  (4), (5), (6), (7) respectively 
expressing the technical coefficients for labor and capital𝑏𝑘,𝑖 , the demand 
for factors𝑋𝑘 ,𝑖 , and aggregate demand𝑋𝐷𝑘 : 
 
𝑏1𝑖 = 𝛼1𝑖 .  
𝜔2
𝜔1
 
𝛼2𝑖
 
(4) 
𝑏2𝑖 = 𝛼2𝑖 .  
𝜔1
𝜔2
 
𝛼1𝑖
 
(5) 
𝑋𝑘 ,𝑖 = 𝑏𝑘𝑖 .𝑣𝑖 .𝑌𝑖  (6) 
 
2 The details of these equations can be found in Cadenete et al. (2017) chapter 4 
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𝑋𝐷𝑘 =  𝑋𝑘 ,𝑖
𝑖
 
(7) 
By substituting (4) and (5) in (6) then the resulting expression in (7) we 
obtain: 
 
𝑋𝐷𝑘 =  𝑏𝑘𝑖 . 𝑣𝑖 .𝑌𝑖
𝑖
 (8) 
 
We thus obtain 𝑏𝑘𝑖= 𝑏𝑘𝑖 𝜔𝑘 ,𝑋𝐷𝑘 = 𝑋𝐷𝑘(𝜔𝑘 ,𝑌𝑖). Note also that 𝑋𝐷𝑘does 
not represent anything else than the total endowment of the factor of 
production𝑘 by the household ℎthat was denoted earlier as 𝑒𝑘 ,ℎ  that is: 
 
𝑋𝐷𝑘 =  𝑒𝑘 ,ℎ
ℎ
=  𝑏𝑘𝑖 . 𝑣𝑖 .𝑌𝑖
𝑖
 
(9) 
 
The expression  9 gives us a system of 2 equations and 5 unknown 
variables too (𝜔1 ,𝜔2 ,𝑌1 ,𝑌2 ,𝑌3)  which makes a total of 5 equations and 8 
unknown variables  (𝑃1 ,𝑃2 ,𝑃3 ,𝜔1,𝜔2 ,𝑌1 ,𝑌2 ,𝑌3).  So, there are 3 equations 
missing to make the system square. 
Note to clarify the procedure to be followed for the determination of the 
latter equations that, because of the tax on the factor𝑡𝑘 , the net price of 
factor 𝜔𝑛𝑘is related to its nominal price 𝜔𝑘  by the relation: 
 
𝜔𝑛𝑘 =
𝜔𝑘
1 + 𝑡𝑘
 
(10) 
 
This net factor price makes it possible to elaborate equations (11), (12), 
(13) and (14)respectively representing the tax collected on the output, the 
tax on the factors, the tax on the income and the total tax: 
 
𝑂𝑇 =  𝜏𝑖 .𝑌𝑖 . 𝑃𝑣𝑎𝑖 . 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑃𝑗𝑎𝑗 ,𝑖
𝑗
 
𝑖
 
(11) 
𝐹𝑇 =   𝑡𝑘 .
𝑘𝑖
𝜔𝑛𝑘 .𝑏𝑘 ,𝑖 . 𝑣𝑖 .𝑌𝑖  
(12) 
𝑀𝑇 =  𝑚ℎ . 𝛿ℎ .𝑇𝐶 + 𝜔𝑛𝑘 . 𝑒𝑘 ,ℎ
𝑘
 
ℎ
 
(13) 
𝑇𝐶 = 𝑂𝑇 + 𝐹𝑇 +𝑀𝑇 (14) 
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tarting from equation (2), expression  11 can be simplified as follows: 
 
𝑂𝑇 =  
𝜏𝑖
(1 + 𝜏𝑖)
𝑖
.𝑌𝑖 .𝑃𝑖  (15) 
 
By replacing equations (15),  12 and (13)3 in (14), we obtain: 
 
𝑇𝐶 =  
𝜏𝑖
1 + 𝜏𝑖
𝑖
.𝑌𝑖 .𝑃𝑖 +  𝑡𝑘 .
𝑘𝑖
𝜔𝑘
1 + 𝑡𝑘
. 𝑏𝑘 ,𝑖 . 𝑣𝑖 .𝑌𝑖
+ 𝑚ℎ . 𝛿ℎ .𝑇𝐶 + 
𝜔𝑘
1 + 𝑡𝑘
. 𝑒𝑘 ,ℎ
𝑘
 
ℎ
 
(16) 
 
By grouping we deduce 𝑇𝐶 as follows: 
 
𝑇𝐶 =
 
𝜏𝑖
1+𝜏𝑖
𝑖 .𝑌𝑖 .𝑃𝑖 +   𝑡𝑘 .𝑘𝑖
𝜔𝑘
1+𝑡𝑘
. 𝑏𝑘 ,𝑖 . 𝑣𝑖 .𝑌𝑖 + 𝑚ℎ .   
𝜔𝑘
1+𝑡𝑘
. 𝑒𝑘 ,ℎ𝑘  ℎ
1−  𝑚ℎ .𝛿ℎℎ
 (17) 
 
Equation  17 expresses the total tax collected and is therefore an 
equilibrium equation of the system with 9 variables 
 (𝑃1 ,𝑃2 ,𝑃3 ,𝜔1 ,𝜔2 ,𝑌1 ,𝑌2 ,𝑌3 ,𝑇) . Moreover, the behavior of the equilibrium 
output is given by: 
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝐶𝐷𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑗 .𝑌𝑗
𝑗
 
(18) 
 
This equation indicates that the firm produces output 𝑖  not only to 
satisfy household consumption demand but also to meet the demand for 
intermediary consumption of the branches which is then determined by: 
 
𝑖𝑌𝑖 ,𝑗 = 𝑎𝑖𝑗 .𝑌𝑗  (19) 
 
𝐶𝐷𝑖Being defined as the aggregated demand for individual consumption 
𝐶𝑖,ℎ i.e.: 
𝐶𝐷𝑖 =  𝐶𝑖,ℎ
ℎ
 
(20) 
This demand for individual consumption results from a Marshallian 
maximization program of a Cobb Douglas utility function with constant 
returns to scale, so the resolution gives: 
 
 
3 Equations (12)  and (13) have been reduced as a function of  𝘗,𝜔,𝑌 
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𝐶𝑖,ℎ =
 1−𝑚ℎ .𝛽𝑖,ℎ . 𝛿ℎ .𝑇𝐶 +   
𝜔𝑘
1+𝑡𝑘
. 𝑒𝑘 ,ℎ𝑘   
𝑃𝑖
 (21) 
 
Replacing 21 in (20) we obtain: 
 
𝐶𝐷𝑖 =  
 1 −𝑚ℎ .𝛽𝑖 ,ℎ . 𝛿ℎ .𝑇𝐶 +   
𝜔𝑘
1+𝑡𝑘
. 𝑒𝑘 ,ℎ𝑘   
𝑃𝑖
ℎ
 (22) 
 
Thus,  22 in 18 , gives: 
 
𝑌𝑖 =  
 1−𝑚ℎ .𝛽𝑖,ℎ . 𝛿ℎ .𝑇𝐶 +   
𝜔𝑘
1+𝑡𝑘
. 𝑒𝑘 ,ℎ𝑘   
𝑃𝑖
ℎ
+ 𝑎𝑖𝑗 .𝑌𝑗
𝑗
 (23) 
 
We thus obtain a new system of 3 equations with 9 variables. 
This makes a total of 3 + 2 + 1 + 3 = 9 equations (given by systems 
(3),  9 , (17) and (23)) respectively) and 9 variables. 
However, equality between the number of equations and the number of 
variables does not ensure the existence of an equilibrium 
solution  (𝑃∗,𝜔∗,𝑌∗,𝑇∗) . According to Walras' law, an equation of the 
equilibrium system is redundant. So, to solve it, a variable must be chosen 
as numéraire according to which all the other variables will be expressed. 
This allows for subsequent analysis of the results of the balance in relative 
value rather than in absolute value. 
In addition to the previous equilibrium system, we determine the 
amount of tax collected by the government and dedicated to be transferred 
to households  𝑇𝐶𝑇 by the following equation  24 : 
 
𝑇𝐶𝑇 = 𝑇𝐶.𝜗 
(24) 
 
And the 𝐺𝐷𝑃 is calculated according to income method as follows: 
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 =  𝑉𝐴𝑖
𝑖
+ 𝑇𝐶 −𝑀𝑇 (25) 
 
With 
 
𝑉𝐴𝑖 =  𝑋𝑘 ,𝑖
𝑘
 
(26) 
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Let’s now present the data for analysis. 
 
3.3. Social accounting matrix 
We are implementing Cameroon's Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for 
2016, based on data from the Table of Resources and Employment (TRE) 
from INS (2017) and from the national accounts. The TRE essentially allows 
building the input-output table for intermediary consumption. Information 
on factors of production is collected from the Ministry of Finance (MINFI) 
in collaboration with the INS. This SAM has 7 accounts, namely: 3 accounts 
for firms operating at the same time in the agriculture, industry and 
services; 2 accounts for production factors including labor and capital; 2 
household accounts, one for the rich household and the other for the poor 
household.  
For matrix balancing, three approaches are adopted for comparison: the 
cross-entropy method, the Ordinary Least Squares method and the 
similarity approach. The first two approaches in the literature offer the best 
estimates (Robinson et al., 1998; Robinson & El-Said, 2000; Fall, 2010; Lee & 
Su 2014; Cardenete et al., 2017) of the balanced social accounting matrix 
indicated in the appendix. 
 
3.4. Calibration of the model 
The Calibration procedure consists of determining the initial values of 
the various parameters of the model from which the model will reproduce 
the benchmark equilibrium, that is to reproduce the data of the SAM before 
simulations are performed. Outside the parameters 𝜏𝑖 ,𝑚ℎ ,𝛿ℎ , 𝑡ℎ whose 
values are fixed by the modeler, the scale and elasticity parameters must be 
calibrated. This is the place to recall that the values of the output levels are 
taken directly from the SAM. It is from these values that the calibration is 
carried out. 
Let’s start with the parameter 𝛽𝑖,ℎrepresenting the elasticity of consumer 
demand for good 𝑖 by the household ℎ linked to a Cobb Douglas 
consumption function as follows: 
 
𝑢ℎ 𝐶1ℎ ,𝐶2ℎ ,… ,𝐶𝑁ℎ =  𝐶𝑖,ℎ
𝛽𝑖,ℎ
𝑖
 
(27) 
 
In this economy, the consumer faces 𝑁 consumer goods and his budget 
constraint is given by: 
 
 𝑃𝑖 .𝐶𝑖,ℎ
𝑖
=  1−𝑚ℎ .  𝜔𝑘 . 𝑒𝑘 ,ℎ
𝑘
+ 𝛿ℎ .𝑇𝐶𝑇  (28) 
 
The constraint  27  indicates by the right-hand side the consumer's 
income, which is essentially derived from the sale of the factors of 
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production (the wage for the labor factor and the return of capital for the 
capital factor) but also from a government transfer of value 𝛿ℎ .𝑇𝐶𝑇 since 
only the 𝑇𝐶𝑇 amount is allocated to the transfer to households. All this 
income supports at the same time a direct tax rate𝑚ℎ . The net income of the 
household is then used to finance its consumption of goods whose cost is 
𝑃𝑖 .𝐶𝑖,ℎmonetary units. 
 
𝜕𝑢ℎ  𝐶1ℎ ,𝐶2ℎ ,…,𝐶𝑁ℎ  
𝜕𝐶1ℎ
𝜕𝑢ℎ  𝐶1ℎ ,𝐶2ℎ ,…,𝐶𝑁ℎ  
𝜕𝐶2ℎ
=
𝑃1
𝑃2
⟺
𝛽1,ℎ
𝛽2,ℎ
=
𝑃1 .𝐶1ℎ
𝑃2 .𝐶2ℎ
⟺ 𝛽1,ℎ = 𝛽2,ℎ .
𝑃1 .𝐶1ℎ
𝑃2 .𝐶2ℎ
 
 
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale for two goods, we 
have 
𝛽1,ℎ + 𝛽2,ℎ = 1 which leads to: 
 
𝛽1,ℎ =
𝑃1 .𝐶1ℎ
𝑃1 .𝐶1ℎ + 𝑃2 .𝐶2ℎ
 𝑒𝑡 𝛽2,ℎ =
𝑃2 .𝐶2ℎ
𝑃1 .𝐶1ℎ + 𝑃2 .𝐶2ℎ
 
 
In general, the calibration of the parameter 𝛽𝑖,ℎ is given by: 
 
𝛽𝑖,ℎ =
𝑃0𝑖 .𝐶0𝑖ℎ
 𝑃0𝑗 .𝐶0𝑗 ,ℎ𝑗
 (29) 
 
Note that 𝑃0𝑖  and 𝐶0𝑖ℎ   simply represent the values at the initial year of 
household prices and individual consumption respectively (see Hosoe et 
al., 2010, page 63 for the conversion of quantities into monetary value)). 
Now proceed to the calibration of 𝛼𝑘 ,𝑖 starting from a Cobb Douglas 
production function with technological parameter𝜇𝑗defined by. 
 
𝑄𝑗  𝑋𝑘1 ,𝐶𝑘2,… ,𝐶𝑘𝐾 = 𝜇𝑗 . 𝑋𝑘 ,𝑖
𝛼𝑘 ,𝑖
𝑖
 (30) 
 
Since the producer's budget constraint facing 𝐾 factors of production is 
indicated at an output level𝑄0𝑗 , he will try to solve under this constraint 
the following program: 
 
𝑀𝑖𝑛
𝑖
 𝜔𝑘 .𝑋𝑘 ,𝑖
𝑘
 (31) 
 
As previously for the case of the consumer, it is easy to show that the 
elasticity of demand for the productionfactor 𝑘 by firm𝑖 is defined by: 
 
𝛼𝑘 ,𝑖 =
𝜔0𝑘 .𝑋0𝑘 ,𝑖
 𝜔0𝑘 .𝑋0𝑘 ,𝑗𝑗
 
(32) 
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Once 𝛼𝑘 ,𝑖 is known, the technological parameter 𝜇𝑗 can be determined 
knowing the production 𝑄0𝑗which in principle is equal to the value added 
𝑉𝐴0𝑗 since it does not yet take into account the intermediary demand of the 
factors. So, we have:  
 
𝑉𝐴0𝑗  𝑋0𝑘1,𝐶0𝑘2,… ,𝐶0𝑘𝐾 = 𝜇𝑗 . 𝑋0𝑘 ,𝑖
𝛼𝑘 ,𝑖
𝑖
 
 
This leads to4: 
 
𝜇𝑗 =
𝑉𝐴0𝑗
 𝑋0𝑘 ,𝑖
𝛼𝑘 ,𝑖
𝑖
 (33) 
 
As for the coefficients of the input-output matrix𝑎𝑖𝑗 , their calibration is 
simply deduced from the relation between 𝑖𝑌𝑖𝑗  and 𝑌𝑗 where we have 
𝑖𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝑎𝑖𝑗 .𝑌𝑗but considering that we reason in value rather than in volume 
we obtain: 
 
𝑎𝑖𝑗 =
𝑖𝑌0𝑖𝑗
𝑃0𝑗 .𝑌0𝑗
 
(34) 
 
Apart from these parameters intrinsic to the model, other parameters are 
deduced directly from the SAM, namely: 
𝐶0𝑖ℎ , 𝑖𝑌0𝑖𝑗 ,𝑌0𝑗 ,𝐶𝐷0𝑖 ,𝑉𝐴0𝑗 ,𝑋0𝑘 ,𝑖 ,𝑋𝐷0𝑘 . On the other hand, the initial values 
of the prices are defined equal to unity, that is 𝑃0𝑖 = 1;𝜔0𝑘 = 1. 
 
3.5. Closure model  
Given the objective of this work, which is to determine the threshold of 
the indirect tax rate on the labor output factor that is revenue neutral with 
regard to income tax rate5; we organize this work around two waves of 
scenarios. The firsts are aimed primarily at questioning the impact of a 
transfer of the government tax to households on their utility. The second 
wave of the scenarios takes up the central question of the labor tax 
threshold to compensate for legitimate losses by canceling the direct tax.  
Specifically, the first wave of scenarios all based on an indirect tax 𝜏𝑖 = 10% 
across all branches, focuses on: 
 First, a simulation of the behavior of the economy variables when 
all the government transferable income 𝑇𝐶𝑇 is transferred to rich 
households 𝛿1 = 1; 
 The second scenario assumes an equal sharing of this government 
income between rich and poor households 𝛿1 = 0.5; 
 
4  An alternative formulation of the parameter 𝜇𝑗  is given by  𝜇𝑗 = 𝛼1𝑗
−𝛼1𝑗 .𝛼2𝑗
−𝛼2𝑗  see 
Cardenete et al., (2017). 
5 This objective matches with that of resolving the crises 
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 The third scenario is based on a full transfer of TCT to poor 
households𝛿1 = 0. 
The second wave of scenarios basically holds an equal sharing i.e. 
𝛿1 = 0.5 and includes three simulations but three other simulations are 
made in order to question the opportunity to tax the capital factor of 
production: 
 A 10% increase in the tax on the labor factor; 
 A tax rate of 20% on the direct tax collected on household income; 
 An adjustment of the tax rate on the labor factor compatible with 
the cancellation of the 20% of the direct tax on household income; 
 A 10% increase in the tax on the capital factor; 
 A 10% tax increase on both labor and capital factors; 
 An application of the labor tax equilibrium rate rather than the 
capital factor. 
It should be noted that the last three scenarios are intended to justify the 
orientation made on the taxation of the labor factor. 
However, it must be recognized here that the calibration of models, 
especially when they become complex, makes it necessary to distinguish 
the endogenous variables from the exogenous ones. In this case, calibration 
refers to specifying and justifying the choice and the appropriateness of the 
exogenous variables according to the problem raised. For more details see 
Decaluwé et al., (2001) and Hosoe et al., (2010). 
 
4. Results 
The results are presented in two stages: firstly, as described above, we 
present in subsection 4.1 below the results of the first scenarios dealing 
with the issue of distribution effects of the transferable government tax 
transferred to households. Then the rate of the tax applicable on the labor 
factor to compensate for the renunciation of the direct taxes is exposed and 
supported in subsection 4.2. Moreover, we justify the orientation made on 
the labor factor in subsection 4.3. 
 
4.1. Tax distribution effects 
Let’s first recall that the half of the tax collected by the government 
represents the effective amount of income that has to be transferred in the 
circumstance of Anglophone crisis in North-west and South-west region. 
The other half is transferrable to all the households in the country. It 
derives from an indirect tax on both agricultural, industrial and services 
productions at the rate of 10% in each. It should also be noted that the 
interpretation of the results calls for precautionary measures as long as 
prices are always expressed in terms of numéraire. We have considered in 
this work as numéraire the net labor price𝜔𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑏 . This is actually an 
arbitrary unit of measurement in which all our results will be expressed. 
Consider the case of prices: then we must keep in mind that their starting 
values were set at 1 and therefore any variation found must be analyzed 
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relative to the numeraire. We will therefore be tempted if we consider the 
first column of Table 1 in appendix to say that, the price of agricultural 
goods increases by 20.1% or that of industrial goods increases by 16.3%. We 
cannot validate this because we do not know how much the net price of 
labor would have changed. What we do know is that initially, a unit of 
agricultural good purchased a unit of labor and that after simulation, 1.201 
units of agricultural good must now be exchanged for one unit of labor. 
Alternatively, to buy a unit of labor, we will need 1/1.201 that is about 
0.8326 units of agricultural good. In other words, the labor becomes more 
expensive compared to the agricultural good. 
This precision leads to the observation that they are increasing when the 
transfer is made from rich households to poor households. We go for 
example from 1.201 for 𝛿1 = 1 to 1.207 for 𝛿1 = 0 in the agricultural sector. 
This shows that the policy of taxation and transfer6 is not neutral to the 
evolution of the prices of goods. Concretely, this result reveals that it will 
be necessary to make a little more effort to acquire a unit of each good 
relative to the acquisition of a unit of labor by the firms, and more again in 
the case of a transfer to poor households. 
On the other hand, when we analyze the results linked to the price of the 
capital factor also expressed in index, we can see that it becomes cheaper to 
acquire with respect to the agricultural sector and expensive for industrial 
and services sectors compared to a unit labor factor. However, we must 
avoid thinking about a substitution of capital for labor in the case of 
agricultural good. The ingenuity here is to understand that less capital has 
been used in each sector of activity except the industrial sector (see 
appendix SAM). This weakness in the demand for capital has therefore 
caused the price of this factor to fall. And even beyond that, if there had 
been a substitution effect of capital for labor, this effect would be rather 
marginal regarding the output effect which is clearly materialized by the 
increase in production relative to labor. The latter brings some relevant 
information.  
Indeed, when the entire transfer is made to rich households, agricultural 
production7 and industrial production fall relative to labor. Their index 
values are indeed 0.941 and 0.994, a fall of 5.9% and 0.6% respectively. On 
the other hand, the service sector is expanding, with production increasing 
by 2.8%. On the other side, where all the transfer is done for poor 
households, the effect is totally reversed. In this case, only the services 
sector is experiencing a fall in production relative to labor, while 
agricultural and industrial productions are in a better state. They increase 
by 3.8% and 1.3% respectively. In the case of equal sharing of the transfer, 
the industrial and services sectors benefit while agricultural production is 
 
6 It must of course be kept in mind that the tax transferred is first of all derived from an 
indirect tax rate  
7 A distinction is made here between gross output and net output which takes into account 
the intermediary production of branches and it is always preferable to pay attention to the 
net values of production 
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declining. These results also show that the policy of transfer to the 
households is not neutral compared to the production of the branches. On 
top of that it gives relevant remarks.  
Indeed, if the government wishes to boost production through this 
transfer mechanism, she must be known that the results will not be positive 
for all sectors at the same time. At most two of the three sectors will benefit: 
 If he wishes to encourage the development of the agricultural and 
industrial sectors, she will have to transfer the income to poor 
households; 
 If he aims to boost the industrial and service sectors, she will have 
to share equally the amount of transferable income between the two 
groups of households; 
 But if he transfers all this income to rich households, she will have 
to know that only the services sector will benefit. 
Let’s now focus on the factors allocation in different sectors. The first 
observation that emerges is that the index values of factors are decreasing 
in the agricultural and industrial sectors relative to the labor when transfers 
go to rich households. There are increasing only in the services sector. 
When poor receive all the transfer, the situation is reverse while 
agricultural and industrial sector perceive differently the impact. These 
results corroborate what we have mentioned above on the price of capital. 
It is understandable that the decline in the value of the capital factor in 
agricultural sector makes it more abundant. In contrary, the growing of 
industrial and services sectors explain the other results. Let's end this 
section with the effects on well-being. 
No result on the utility of the household receiving the transfer is 
surprising even if it is a little mixed for the rich. In the case of a transfer to 
the poor, their utility increases by 19.986 % while that of the rich decreases 
by 14.512%. When this income is shared equally, it reduces the welfare of 
the poor to 1.665% while the decline in the welfare of the rich improves. 
The latter becomes positive and reaches 11.081% when the rich receives all 
the transfer while the poor sees his welfare deteriorate in this case. This loss 
of 15.312% is almost equivalent to the loss recorded by the rich when they 
receive nothing. Given this result and the security tensions that prevail in 
the Anglophone regions, a policy oriented towards a transfer to the poor or 
equal transfer could help to dilute or to allay the social tensions that swarm 
all over the national territory.  
 
4.2. Equivalent rate of the labor tax 
The question for the equivalent labor factor rate to reduce the losses 
from the abandoning of consumer income taxation assumes that the 
government's transfer to households is done on an equal basis. Let’s note 
from the onset a major piece of information: we note that the three 
scenarios in Table 2 in appendix contribute to improving the well-being of 
poor households against the rich. Indeed, the collection of 10% of the tax on 
the use of labor factor by the firms improves the utility of the poor by 3.18% 
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and deteriorates that of the rich by 2.325%. These proportions increase to 
5.478% and 3.99% respectively when the government collects a 20% tax on 
the income of each household group. At this point, an explanation may be 
due to the fact that the equal transfer of government income to households 
is only profitable to poor households as we have shown above (see Table 1 
in appendix). As a result, the higher the income transferred, the better the 
situation of the poor and the deterioration of the rich. This situation is 
comparable to the Pareto optimum. 
As for the rate applicable to the labor factor to compensate for the losses 
due to a waiver of the direct taxation of 20%, we obtained a rate of 34.569%. 
Indeed, with a rate of 20% on the income of the consumers, the government collects 
a transferable global income of CFAF 2429.149 billion against a substantially equal 
amount of CFAF 2429.147 billion for a rate of 34.569% on the use of labor factor. 
What can we learn from this rate? Two major pieces of information can 
flow from this result:   
 First, the search for such a compensation rate is not neutral on 
microeconomic variables 
Indeed, by applying this rate, we first notice that the prices of goods 
increase relative to the price of capital. The price of agricultural products 
increases from 1.205 to 1.621 henceforth that agricultural goods become less 
and less expensive compared to the acquisition price of a unit of capital. On 
the other hand, the nominal price of the labor factor is affected since its net 
price has been taken as numéraire. This shows that a low tax does not affect 
the nominal value of the labor while the latter reacts upward when the rate 
of tax becomes important. The same goes for capital that becomes cheaper 
to acquire in relation to labor. Its price index goes from 1.006 to 1.353. 
 Secondly, there is no neutrality on macroeconomic variables 
The case of the GDP is as far as concerned here. In fact, an income tax 
has a negative effect on growth with an index of 0.801, while substituting a 
labor rate of 34.569% leads to an increase in growth rate of 7.8%. 
In summary, the rate of 34.569% serves to two things:  
 First, it allows the amount of the direct tax lost by the government 
to be recovered as originally intended; 
 Secondly, it ensures economic growth. This growth largely depends 
on the remuneration of the factors that contribute to the value 
added of the branches. 
So, a question at this level deserves to be asked: is there an equitable 
distribution of transferable income that would at the same time improve 
the situation of the rich and the poor? In trying to answer this question, we 
readjust the value of𝛿1, which is the fraction of income allocated to rich 
households. The fact is that, the two groups of households cannot see their 
well-being improve at the same time. So, another additional question is: in 
this case, what is the rate applicable to 𝛿1that neutralizes the utility of the 
two household groups? The answer to this last question is that a 56.45% 
income transfer to the rich versus 43.55% for the poor renders the 
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usefulness of the two household groups almost null. That of rich 
households is -0.005% against -0.020% for the poor. 
 
4.3. What about the case where the tax on capital is concerned? 
Could we have had the same results with a targeted policy around the 
tax on capital? Or could it have been better to go further? These two 
questions justify the extension that we make in this point. 
The answer to these questions is provided by the results in Table 3 in 
appendix, which shows that, a policy based on capital factor taxation is 
ineffective in either recovering direct tax losses or boosting growth. First, 
the amount of the tax resulting from a tax rate of 34.569% for the capital 
factor is only CFAF 1337.997 billion contrary to the tax on labor. A fairly 
simple reason is that households are poorly endowed with capital as we 
indicated above (see SAM). Besides, growth is reduced by 6.5% while there 
was a rise of 7.8% with the tax on labor.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The purpose of this article was to develop a policy of indirect taxation 
on output factors which makes it possible to reconcile the losses in case of a 
waiver of the direct tax. This initiative may help in the resolution of the 
security crisis in North-west and South-west regions in Cameroon. A static 
computable general equilibrium model has enabled us to determine the 
equivalent rate applicable to the labor factor that would make it possible to 
compensate for losses if the government shifts away from taxation of 
household income. This rate is 34.569% for an income tax rate of 20%. It 
also allows boosting growth with an impact on GDP of 7.8%. Apart from 
this rate, the total revenue that could be allocated to the victims of the 
Anglophone crisis is CFAF 2429.149 billion. Besides, half of the government 
income from an indirect tax of 10% on the outputs is transferred completely 
to the households either all to the rich, or all to the poor, or an equal 
sharing between the two groups. And according to the adopted policy, the 
household that receives the totality of the income sees its well-being 
improve whereas in case of an equal sharing only the poor households 
benefit from it.  
Therefore, one can wonder if it could be quite easy to implement such a 
policy. That is, could Cameroonian firms support a supplementary tax of 
10% on output? This carry out an important issue concerning the economic 
partnership agreement which is applicable by Cameroon three years ago. 
Unfortunately, this agreement doesn’t favor this economy. Indeed, the 
national commission for monitoring and evaluation of the Cameroon EPA 
indicated in August 2017 that, this agreement has engaged losses of CFAF 
685 million without creating any welfare effect on households and these 
losses seem amplifying one year to another. Thus, we recommend to resign 
this agreement first in order to allow the local firms to deploy their activity 
effectiveness. 
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Appendix 
Table 1. Impact on micro indicators  
 𝛿1 = 1 𝛿1 = 0.5 𝛿1 = 0 
Price of 
commodities 
   
𝑃𝑎𝑔𝑟  1.201 1.204 1.207 
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑑  1.163 1.169 1.176 
𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑟  1.157 1.160 1.162 
Factor Price    
𝜔𝑙𝑎𝑏  1.000 1.000 1.000 
𝜔𝑐𝑎𝑝  0.993 1.004 1.015 
Change in gross 
output 
   
𝑌𝑎𝑔𝑟  0.941 0.989 1.038 
𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑑  0.994 1.003 1.013 
𝑌𝑠𝑒𝑟  1.028 1.001 0.974 
Change in net 
output 
   
𝑌𝑎𝑔𝑟  0.927 0.986 1.046 
𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑑  0.999 1.008 1.016 
𝑌𝑠𝑒𝑟  1.065 1.004 0.943 
Utility variation (%)    
∆𝑈𝑟𝑖𝑐ℎ  11.081 -1.655 -14.512 
∆𝑈𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟  -15.312 2.255 19.986 
Allocation factor 
(agr) 
   
𝐿𝑎𝑏 0.940 0.990 1.040 
𝐶𝑎𝑝 0.947 0.998 1.024 
Allocation factor 
(ind) 
   
𝐿𝑎𝑏 0.990 1.006 1.022 
𝐶𝑎𝑝 0.997 1.002 1.007 
Allocation factor 
(ser) 
   
𝐿𝑎𝑏 1.027 1.002 0.976 
𝐶𝑎𝑝 1.035 0.998 0.961 
Total tax receipt    
𝑇𝐶𝑇 897.442 904.912 912.510 
GDP variation    
𝐺𝐷𝑃 0.998 1.001 1.004 
𝜏𝑖 = 10% in all the activity sectors  
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Table 2. Result for labour factor controlling 
 𝑡𝑙𝑎𝑏 = 10% 𝑚𝑖ℎ = 20% 𝑡𝑙𝑎𝑏 = 34.569% 
Price of commodities    
𝑃𝑎𝑔𝑟  1.324 1.205 1.621 
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑑  1.286 1.170 1.574 
𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑟  1.276 1.160 1.561 
Factor Price    
𝜔𝑙𝑎𝑏  1.100 1.000 1.346 
𝜔𝑐𝑎𝑝  1.105 1.006 1.353 
Change in gross output    
𝑌𝑎𝑔𝑟  0.992 0.998 0.996 
𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑑  1.004 1.005 1.005 
𝑌𝑠𝑒𝑟  1.000 0.996 0.997 
Change in net output    
𝑌𝑎𝑔𝑟  0.989 0.997 0.995 
𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑑  1.008 1.009 1.005 
𝑌𝑠𝑒𝑟  1.001 0.993 0.997 
Utility variation (%)    
∆𝑈𝑟𝑖𝑐ℎ  -2.325 -3.991 -3.549 
∆𝑈𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟  3.180 5.478 4.867 
Allocation factor (agr)    
𝐿𝑎𝑏 0.992 0.999 0.997 
𝐶𝑎𝑝 0.988 0.993 0.991 
Allocation factor (ind)    
𝐿𝑎𝑏 1.007 1.009 1.008 
𝐶𝑎𝑝 1.002 1.003 1.002 
Allocation factor (ser)    
𝐿𝑎𝑏 1.000 0.997 0.998 
𝐶𝑎𝑝 0.996 0.991 0.992 
Total tax receipt    
𝑇𝐶𝑇 1345.837 2429.149 2429.147 
GDP variation    
𝐺𝐷𝑃 1.027 0.801 1.078 
𝜏𝑖 = 10% in all the activity sectors and 𝛿1 = 0.5 
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Table 3. Impact for capital factor controlling  
 𝑡𝑘 = 10% 𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝 = 10% 𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝 = 34.569% 
Price of commodities    
𝑃𝑎𝑔𝑟  1.325 1.204 1.204 
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑑  1.286 1.169 1.170 
𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑟  1.276 1.160 1.160 
Factor Price    
𝜔𝑙𝑎𝑏  1.100 1.000 1.000 
𝜔𝑐𝑎𝑝  1.105 1.004 1.005 
Change in gross output    
𝑌𝑎𝑔𝑟  0.993 0.991 0.993 
𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑑  1.004 1.004 1.004 
𝑌𝑠𝑒𝑟  0.999 1.000 0.999 
Change in net output    
𝑌𝑎𝑔𝑟  0.991 0.988 0.991 
𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑑  1.008 1.008 1.008 
𝑌𝑠𝑒𝑟  0.999 1.002 0.999 
Utility variation (%)    
∆𝑈𝑟𝑖𝑐ℎ  -2.717 -2.046 -2.761 
∆𝑈𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟  3.720 2.795 3.782 
Allocation factor (agr)    
𝐿𝑎𝑏 0.994 0.991 0.994 
𝐶𝑎𝑝 0.989 0.987 0.989 
Allocation factor (ind)    
𝐿𝑎𝑏 1.007 1.006 1.007 
𝐶𝑎𝑝 1.002 1.002 1.002 
Allocation factor (ser)    
𝐿𝑎𝑏 1.000 1.001 0.999 
𝐶𝑎𝑝 0.995 0.997 0.994 
Total tax receipt    
𝑇𝐶𝑇 1514.420 1058.080 1337.997 
GDP variation    
𝐺𝐷𝑃 1.001 0.977 0.935 
𝜏𝑖 = 10% in all the activity sectors and 𝛿1 = 0.5 
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Table 4. Social Accounting Matrix (SAM for Cameroon 2016) 
AGR IND SER LAB CAP RICH POOR TOT
AGR 171,6986 425,4018 246,2275 1208,9920 1927,6801 3980,0000
IND 981,3960 852,6727 956,5011 2008,1634 1651,2668 6450,0000
SER 1091,2840 1023,9110 880,9074 2782,8445 771,0531 6550,0000
LAB 1516,2997 1587,5483 3896,1521 7000,0000
CAP 219,3218 2560,4663 570,2119 3350,0000
RICH 4021,7148 1978,2852 6000,0000
POOR 2978,2852 1371,7148 4350,0000
TOT 3980,0000 6450,0000 6550,0000 7000,0000 3350,0000 6000,0000 4350,0000
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GAMS CODE OF THE MODEL 
When importing data make sure that the excel file is in the same directory with gams file. You will just 
need to follow File-View in explorer and you paste the Excel file. you should download the demo 
version of GAMS at (http://www.gams.com) 
 
$title Cameroon tax general equilibrium model: 
option decimals=3; 
option nlp=conopt; 
 
set m sam accounts / agr, ind, ser, lab, cap, rich, poor, tot/ 
 
    i(m) goods /agr, ind, ser/ 
 
    k(m) factors /lab, cap/ 
 
    h(m) households /rich, poor/ 
 
  alias (i,j) 
  alias(k,l) 
  alias(m,n); 
 
  parameters 
  sam(m,n)              social accounting matrix entries 
  e(h,k)                    endowment 
  beta(i,h)                cd utility coefficients 
  a(i,j)                      input-output coefficients 
  alpha(k,i)              production function coefficients 
  v(i)                       value-added coefficients 
  va0(i)                   value added 
  p0(i)                     prices for goods 
  wn0(k)                  net prices for factors 
  w0(k)                   prices for factors 
  y0(i)                     total output 
  pva0(i)                 price of value-added 
  b0(k,i)                  flexible factor coefficients 
  c0(i,h)                  individual demand for final consumption 
  cd0(i)                   aggregate demand for final consumption 
  x0(k,i)                  firms factor demand 
  xd0(k)                  aggregate factor demand 
  iy0(i,j)                  intermediate consumption of good i by firm j 
  mu(i)                    technological parameter of value added 
  gdp0                     baseline gdp; 
 
  parameter 
  tau(i)                    output tax rates 
  mi(h)                    income tax 
  t(k)                      factor tax 
  theta                     fraction of government income transferred to consumers 
  del(h)                   lump sum shares; 
 
  tau(i)=0; 
  mi(h)=0; 
  t(k) = 0; 
  del(h)=0; 
 
*============importation of data from social accounting matrix======= 
 
$call gdxxrw.exe i=proj.xlsx o=pour.gdx par=sam rng=feuil1!a1:i9 rdim=1 cdim=1 
$gdxin pour.gdx 
$load sam 
$gdxin 
 
*========initialization and calibration of parameters================ 
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  p0(i)        = 1; 
  w0(k)      = 1; 
  wn0(k)       = 1; 
  y0(i)        = sam('tot',i); 
  pva0(i)     = 1; 
  c0(i,h)      = sam(i,h); 
  cd0(i)      = sum(h, c0(i,h)); 
  x0(k,i)     = sam(k,i); 
  xd0(k)      = sum(i,x0(k,i)); 
  iy0(i,j)      = sam(i,j); 
  e(h,k)      = sam(h,k) ; 
  beta(i,h)   = p0(i)*c0(i,h)/sum(j,p0(j)*c0(j,h)); 
  a(i,j)        = iy0(i,j)/y0(j); 
  alpha(k,i)   = w0(k)*x0(k,i)/(sum(l,w0(l)*x0(l,i))); 
  va0(i)      = sum(k,x0(k,i)); 
  v(i)      = va0(i)/y0(i); 
  b0(k,i)     = x0(k,i)/(v(i)*y0(i)); 
  theta        = 0.5; 
  mu(i)       = va0(i)/prod(k, x0(k,i)**alpha(k,i)); 
  gdp0        =  sum(i,va0(i)) ; 
 
  display p0,sam,w0,y0,pva0,va0,gdp0,c0,cd0,x0,xd0,iy0,b0,e,beta,a,alpha,v,mu; 
 
*==================definition of variables===================== 
  variable 
  p(i)                      prices for goods 
  w(k)                    prices for factors 
  wn(k)                  net prices for factors 
  y(i)                      total output 
  pva(i)                  price of value-added 
  b(k,i)                   flexible factor coefficients 
  c(i,h)                   individual demand for final consumption 
  cd(i)                    aggregate demand for final consumption 
  x(k,i)                   firms factor demand 
  xd(k)                   aggregate factor demand 
  tc                         total tax collections 
  ot                         output tax collections 
  ft                         factor tax collections 
  mt                       income tax collections 
  iy(i,j)                  intermediate consumption of good i by firm j 
  va(i)                   value added for firm i 
  gdp                     gdp-income calculation 
  z                         maximizing dummy 
  tct                       total transferable tax ; 
 
*===================declaration of equations=================== 
  equation 
  vaprice(i)            price index for value added 
  prices(i)              price formation 
  facprices(k)        net and gross factor prices 
  demand(i)           total demand for goods 
  housdem(i,h)      households demand for goods 
  lab(i)                  variable coefficient for labour 
  cap(i)                 variable coefficient for capital 
  zdfac(k,i)           firms demand for factors 
  zfacdem(k)        total demand for factors 
  governm            government budget constraint 
  incometax          income tax collections 
  factortax            factor tax collections 
  outputtax           output tax collections 
  eqgoods(i)         equilibrium for goods 
  eqfactors(k)       equilibrium for factors 
  inter(i,j)             intermediate consumption of good i by firm j 
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  eqva(i)               value added for firm i 
  eqgdp                 gdp-income calculation 
  eqtax                  share tax equation 
  maximand          aux objective function; 
 
*==================definition of equations====================== 
 
  vaprice(i)..           pva(i) =e= prod(k, w(k)**alpha(k,i)); 
  prices(i)..             p(i) =e= (1+tau(i))*(pva(i)*v(i)+sum(j,p(j)*a(j,i))); 
  facprices(k)..       w(k) =e= wn(k)*(1+t(k)) ; 
  demand(i)..          cd(i) =e= sum(h, c(i,h)); 
  housdem(i,h)..  c(i,h)=e=(1-mi(h))*beta(i,h)*(del(h)*tc+sum(k, wn(k)*e(h,k)))/p(i); 
  lab(i)..                  b('lab',i) =e= alpha('lab',i)*(w('cap')/w('lab'))**alpha('cap',i) ; 
  cap(i)..                 b('cap',i) =e= alpha('cap',i)*(w('lab')/w('cap'))**alpha('lab',i) ; 
  zdfac(k,i)..           x(k,i) =e= b(k,i)*v(i)*y(i); 
  zfacdem(k)..        xd(k) =e= sum(i, x(k,i)); 
  governm..            tc =e= ot + ft+ mt ; 
  incometax..          mt =e= sum(h, mi(h)*(del(h)*tc+sum(k, wn(k)*e(h,k))) ); 
  factortax..            ft =e= sum( (i,k), t(k)*wn(k)*b(k,i)*v(i)*y(i) ); 
  outputtax..            ot =e= sum(i, tau(i)*p(i)*y(i)/(1+tau(i))); 
  eqtax..                  tct =e= tc*theta ; 
  eqgoods(i)..         y(i)=e= cd(i) + sum(j, a(i,j)*y(j)); 
  eqfactors(k)..       xd(k)=e= sum(h, e(h,k)); 
  inter(i,j)..             iy(i,j) =e= a(i,j)*p(j)*y(j); 
  eqva(i)..               va(i) =e= sum(k, x(k,i)); 
  eqgdp..                gdp  =e=  sum(i,va(i)) + tc-mt; 
  maximand..           z =e= 1; 
 
 
*=======================model declaration==================== 
  model taxcam /all/; 
 
*=====================fixing lower bounds on variables============ 
  scalar lb lower bound /1e-4/; 
 
  p.lo(i)=lb; y.lo(i)=lb; w.lo(k)=lb; pva.lo(i)=lb; c.lo(i,h)=lb; 
  b.lo(k,i)=lb; x.lo(k,i)=lb; iy.lo(i,j)=lb; 
 
*===================numeraire: net price factor================== 
  wn.fx('lab') = 1;     z.fx = 1 ; 
 
*==================initialisation of variables==================== 
  p.l(i)=p0(i); y.l(i)=y0(i);  w.l(k)=w0(k);  pva.l(i)=pva0(i);  c.l(i,h)=c0(i,h); 
  b.l(k,i)=b0(k,i);  x.l(k,i)=x0(k,i);  va.l(i)=va0(i);  iy.l(i,j)=iy0(i,j); 
    wn.l('cap') = wn0('cap');  cd.l(i) = cd0(i) ;   tc.l =0; xd.l(k) = xd0(k); 
   gdp.l =gdp0;   ft.l =0; ot.l= 0; tct.l = 0; mt.l = 0; 
 
 
* taxcam.iterlim=0; 
 
  solve taxcam maximizing z using nlp ; 
 
  option limrow = 0, limcol = 0, solprint = off, solvelink = %solvelink.loadlibrary%; 
 
*=================save benchmark results====================== 
  parameter 
  y0(i)              benchmark gross output of i 
  ny0(i)           benchmark net output of i 
  pc0(i)           benchmark consumption of i 
  u0(h)           benchmark utility of h; 
 
  y0(i)        = y.l(i); 
  ny0(i)     = y.l(i)-sum(j, a(i,j)*y.l(j)); 
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  pc0(i)      = sum(h, c.l(i,h)); 
  u0(h)       = prod(i, c.l(i,h)**beta(i,h)); 
 
*=========for different scenarios both for first and second results======== 
tau(i)  = 0.1; 
 
*  t('lab')  = 0.1; 
*  t('lab')  = 0.34569; 
*  mi(h)  = 0.20; 
*  t(k)  = 0.10; 
*  t('cap') = 0.10; 
t('cap')   = 0.34569; 
 
*========choose redistribution parameter========================= 
  del('rich') = 0.5     ; del('poor') =1-del('rich'); 
*  del('rich') = 0.56444 ;    del('poor') =1-del('rich'); 
 
*================solve model under policy====================== 
  solve taxcam maximizing z using nlp ; 
 
  parameter 
  u(h)               utility of h's household 
  du(h)             utility changes 
  wag               wages 
  kap                capital income 
  pc(i)               consumption of good i 
  prc                 private consumption 
  gdpi               gdp-income 
  gdpe               gdp-expenditure 
  ny(i)               net output 
  dny(i)             change or index for net output of i 
  dy(i)               change or index for gross output of i 
  igdpi               gdp income 
  igdpe              gdp expenditure 
  ip(i)                price index 
  ic(i,h)             consumption index 
  ix(k,i)             index for factor allocation 
  gdpi0              benchmark gdp 
  ; 
 
  u(h)         = prod(i, c.l(i,h)**beta(i,h)); 
  du(h)       = (u(h)/u0(h)-1)*100; 
  wag         = wn.l('lab')*xd.l('lab'); 
  kap          = wn.l('cap')*xd.l('cap'); 
  pc(i)        = sum(h, c.l(i,h)); 
  prc           = sum(i, p.l(i)*pc(i)); 
  gdpi         = wag+kap+tc.l; 
  gdpe        = prc; 
  ny(i)        = y.l(i)-sum(j, a(i,j)*y.l(j)); 
  ix(k,i)      = x.l(k,i)/x0(k,i) ; 
* output indexation: 
  dny(i)      = ny(i)/ny0(i) ; 
  dy(i)        = y.l(i)/y0(i); 
  gdpi0       = sum(i,va0(i))+  tc.l; 
  igdpi        = (sum(i,va0(i))+  tc.l)/gdpi0  ; 
  ip(i)         = p.l(i)/p0(i); 
  ic(i,h)       = c.l(i,h)/c0(i,h); 
  igdpe       = prc/gdpi0 ; 
 
  display del, tau,e,igdpi,ip,ic,t,pva.l,du,c.l,pc,prc,iy.l, m, 
  p.l, w.l,wn.l,cd.l,ix, b.l,dy, dny,ft.l,ot.l, x.l, y.l, 
  gdpi, gdpi0, igdpe,wag, kap, tc.l,tct.l, gdpe; 
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